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Abstract
Life on Earth descends from a common ancestor. However, it is likely that there are
other instances of life in the universe. If so, each abiogenesis event will have given rise to 
an independently originated life clade (IOLC), of which Earth-life is an example. In this 
paper, I argue that the set of all IOLCs in the universe forms a Darwinian population 
subject to natural selection, with more widely dispersed IOLCs being less likely to face 
extinction. As a result, we should expect that, over time, more planets will become 
inhabited by fewer, more successful IOLCs.
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1. Introduction. The study of life in the universe is one of the most intellectually exciting 
human pursuits, and the discovery of extraterrestrial life, or even evidence of extinct life 
unrelated to Earth-life, would be, without a doubt, the most important discovery of all time.
Despite the extraordinary diversity of life on Earth, with a vast array of organisms using 
different kinds of metabolism and energy sources (e.g. phototrophy, chemotrophy, 
heterotrophy), all of this diversity has been generated by evolution from a single origin. 
For that reason, life on Earth effectively constitutes a single sample of life, a problem 
known as N=1.
Due to this limitation, we have been unable to develop a theoretical framework for 
the understanding of life that goes beyond simply listing the features of Earth life we find 
particularly important (Cleland and Chyba 2002). For this reason, many authors have 
assumed a pessimistic view of the possibility of defining life (e.g. Cleland 2012, 2019; 
Machery 2012), with some authors going so far as to consider the question to be incoherent
in the first place (Mariscal and Doolittle 2018). Other authors, however, point to the 
usefulness of pragmatic, operational or diagnostic definitions of life for astrobiology 
research (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2017; Bich and Green 2018). While there is no doubt 
that a second example of life would be a huge step towards our understanding of life in the 
universe and the development of an adequate Theory of Life (Cleland 2019), it would not 
magically solve the problem, as it would only raise our sample from one to two. It would 
not allow us to claim that the features shared by both examples of life were universal.
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Nonetheless, it is possible to contribute to the programme of universal biology, and 
even make some progress towards a future Theory of Life, in the absence of a second 
sample of independently originated life (Mariscal and Fleming 2018; Segura et al. 2020). 
The purpose of universal biology is not just to identify which features of life on Earth are 
contingent and which are universal, but also to clarify the different concepts associated 
with the phenomenon of life (Hermida 2016; Segura et al. 2020) and, I suggest, to 
investigate the structure of life in the universe from a distinctly biological perspective. This
paper aims to contribute to that project, by advancing a hypothesis concerning life in the 
universe.
Since life on Earth descends from a common ancestor, it constitutes a large 
monophyletic clade. If other instances of life exist in the universe, each abiogenesis event 
will presumably give rise to an independent clade. In this paper, I argue that the set of 
independently originated life clades in the universe constitutes a Darwinian population 
subject to natural selection. The proposed theory gives an account of the structure of life 
across the universe in terms of specifically biological categories, and extends the domain 
of application of natural selection. This is important since much theoretical work 
concerning the nature of life is based on concepts and categories borrowed from other 
sciences, e.g. thermodynamics (Schrödinger 1992), chemistry (Pross 2012), or information 
(Korzeniewski 2001). This work aims to bring all life in the universe within the scope of 
biology, which we have good reason to believe is a truly universal science, despite the 
dearth of study samples so far.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I clarify the concepts 
discussed, including ‘life’, ‘Earth-life’, ‘IOLC’, and ‘biosphere’. In section 3, I introduce 
the concept of IOLC selection as a particular kind of clade selection, and explain how it 
escapes much of the criticism levelled at traditional cases of clade selection. In section 4, I 
argue that expansion to other planets constitutes a form of quasi-reproduction, and discuss 
the ways in which it contributes to IOLC fitness. Sections 5 and 6 focus specifically on 
IOLC selection and competition between IOLCs, respectively. Section 7 discusses possible
implications of the theory for the distribution of life in the universe over time. Finally, in 
section 8 I explain how the theory proposed in this paper contributes to clarifying the place
of life as a general concept, and of Earth-life as an individual, in scientific theory.
2. Earth-life as an Individual vs. Life as a Natural Kind. To begin with, it is important 
to clarify a few concepts. I understand life to refer to the process that is instantiated by 
living systems, such as organisms. However, while the life process is instantiated in 
individual organisms, these can only evolve in the context of large historical-collective 
individuals (Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2004), or life-individuals, of which life on Earth is an 
example (Hermida 2016). I propose to further specify this kind of life-individual as the 
maximal clade that includes all the descendant organisms from a particular abiogenesis, or 
origin of life, event, and I will refer to this kind of maximal clade as an independently 
originated life clade, or IOLC.
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I will not attempt here to adjudicate between different definitions of life, or defend 
my own preferred definition, as that would fall outside the scope of this paper. In fact, I 
find it very plausible that we are not, at present, in a condition to formulate a complete 
theory of life (Cleland 2019), and that for that reason all proposed definitions may be 
inadequate. However, the aim of this paper is somewhat orthogonal to the debate 
concerning the definition of life.
For present purposes, I will assume that life is a natural kind,  albeit one of which 
we are at present unable to give a satisfactory definition, but whose nature will be better 
elucidated in the context of a future Theory of Life. Nevertheless, I think there are good 
reasons why we are justified in thinking that life is indeed a natural kind. The main reason 
is that it is overwhelmingly likely that there are more instances of life in the Universe, and 
moreover this is true regardless of which definition of life is employed. For instance, even 
if we were to restrict the scope of ‘life’ to ‘life as we know it’, – i.e. carbon based, using 
liquid water as a medium – it would still be overwhelmingly likely that Earth-life is not the
only instance of this phenomenon. In fact, given the ample abundance of carbon, water, 
and potential energy sources in the universe, the spontaneous occurrence of molecules 
which serve as building blocks for Earth-life1, and how quickly it originated on Earth as 
soon as the heavy bombardment ceased (Lineweaver and Davies 2002), it is extremely 
unlikely that Earth-life should be the only instance. Furthermore, given the vastness of the 
1 For instance, amino acids, nucleobases, and even sugars including ribose, a component of RNA, have 
been discovered in meteorites (Furukawa et al. 2019).
5
universe, very many instances of life are likely to exist even if abiogenesis is extremely 
rare (Schulze-Makuch and Irwin 2006).
In addition, although it is certainly important to be open-minded regarding the 
possibilities for extraterrestrial life (otherwise, unexpected kinds of life might go 
undetected), we should also avoid the contrary tendency of assuming that alien life 
necessarily has to be strange or anomalous. We know that life based on proteins, lipids, 
DNA, etc, is possible, and we know that both carbon and liquid water are particularly 
amenable to complex biochemistry. And although we might be unable at the moment to 
converge on a satisfactory definition of life, it is also not the case that we don’t know 
anything about life and some of its constraints. In other words, while alien life might 
certainly prove strange and problematic, we should not expect all instances of alien life to 
be problem cases.
Even bracketing most assumptions regarding the nature of life, I take it that it is 
relatively uncontroversial that life cannot emerge as a single isolated organism. While 
Swampman might be metaphysically possible, in the actual world it is highly unlikely that 
a living organism would emerge on its own, and not as part of a population within an 
evolving lineage. Nevertheless, if a particular abiogenesis event were to give rise to a 
single isolated organism with no reproductive capacity, the theory of IOLC selection as 
proposed in this paper would still apply to it – the solitary organism would constitute a 
very uninteresting IOLC composed exclusively of itself.
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In the case of life on Earth, the IOLC is composed of FUCA (the first universal 
common ancestor) and all its descendants, both living and extinct. I refer to this particular 
individual IOLC as Earth-life. An important question which might arise is whether viruses 
and other acellular entities should be included in this clade2. For instance, Hermida’s 
(2016) account of life on Earth as an individual implicitly excludes these, by considering 
continuity at the cellular level as an important feature of the individuality of this historical-
collective entity. However, the theory I propose in this paper is compatible with either 
inclusion or exclusion of acellular entities.
Life on Earth also forms a biosphere, which is associated with a particular planet – 
Earth – but is not coextensive with the Earth-life IOLC, since it is possible for Earth-life to 
expand to other planets, but it is not possible for the Earth’s biosphere to do so, since a 
biosphere is by definition associated with a given planet.
Some authors refer to Earth-life as ‘Life’ (Mariscal and Doolittle 2018, Doolittle 
2019, Lenton et al. 2020). This terminology is somewhat misleading, however, since it 
seems to carry the implication that Earth-life is the only life that exists in the Universe, 
something which, although possible, is highly unlikely. Therefore, in this paper I will use 
life as the generic term, and Earth-life as a name for the particular IOLC that originated on 
Earth. Furthermore, while these authors consider ‘Life’ to include all and only the 
descendants of LUCA (the last universal common ancestor), I see no reason to exclude the 
ancestors of LUCA, since my aim is to identity the maximal clade. I consider a IOLC to 
include all the descendants of an origin-of-life event, extant or not.
2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
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3. Natural Selection, Clade Selection, and IOLC Selection. Evolution by natural 
selection is expected to be true for any life phenomena, anywhere in the universe, 
regardless of the specific details of alien life forms, much as physical and chemical laws 
are reasonably expected to be true across the universe (Dawkins 1983; Sterelny and 
Griffiths 1999; Levin et al. 2019).
Although natural selection may act primarily upon individual organisms, other 
biological levels of organization can also be targets of selection including, among others, 
cell lineages, symbiotic partnerships, species, and possibly higher taxonomic levels. In 
fact, natural selection can act upon any given population of things, provided they satisfy 
the following criteria (Lewontin 1970; Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith 2007):
(1) the entities which compose the population should exhibit variation 
among themselves;
(2) these differences should correlate with differences in fitness; and
(3) the differences are heritable, i.e. they tend to be transmitted from parents
to offspring.
Any population of things which satisfies these criteria constitutes a Darwinian 
population, which can be subject to natural selection (Godfrey-Smith 2009). Here I 
propose that the set of all independently originated life clades in the universe satisfies these
conditions, and constitutes a Darwinian population subject to natural selection. Let us 
examine how IOLCs fare with relation to each criterion.
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Condition (1) is very easily acceptable. While there is ample discussion concerning 
how different independently originated instances of life are likely to be, few would think it 
plausible that all life in the universe should not vary in important respects. At the very 
least, there are likely to be differences in biochemistry, different genetic codes, and so on. 
Furthermore, the particular evolutionary history of each IOLC will necessarily involve a 
high degree of contingency, which will constrain its further evolutionary possibilities. It is 
simply implausible that a population of IOLCs should not exhibit variation.
If there is variation, then it is very likely that some features should be more 
favourable than others. For instance, it might be the case that some biochemical features 
are more versatile than others and allow for higher evolvability. Other favourable features 
might include wide distribution range within its home planet and capacity for 
interplanetary expansion, since both of these will reduce the probability of extinction of the
IOLC (much as large population size and wide distribution range are features which reduce
a species’ extinction risk). So we can conclude that condition (2) also applies.
Condition (3) implies that the entities in question undergo some form of 
reproduction. Okasha (2006, 14) argues that it is essential to the notion of reproduction that
parental and offspring entities belong to the same level in the biological hierarchy, and that 
offspring entities can outlive parental ones (Okasha 2006, 213). In the case of species, 
while they might not literally reproduce, speciation plays the role for species that 
reproduction does for organisms, resulting in the production of at least one new entity of 
the same kind, which can outlive the parental entity.
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IOLC selection, as proposed in this work, is a form of clade selection. The 
possibility of clade selection has been proposed, with some authors arguing that 
cladogenesis is the equivalent of reproduction at clade level – cladogenesis would be to 
clades what speciation is to species (Haber and Hamilton 2005). But there is an important 
difference: when the process of speciation is complete, at least one new species is not part 
of the former species, whereas when a clade divides, all of its descendants are still part of 
the original clade – that is what it means to be a monophyletic clade. This is why Okasha 
(2003; 2006, 213-14) considers clade selection to be conceptually incoherent: sub-clades 
cannot outlive the parent clade; therefore it is meaningless to talk about clade fitness.
Some clade selection theorists counter that clade fitness can be redefined as higher 
survival or differential persistence (Doolittle 2017). In fact, it is possible to defend a more 
encompassing notion of fitness which includes not only multiplication, but also expansion 
and persistence (Van Valen 1976). Under this wider conception of fitness, a plant which 
covers a whole field by sending out clonal runners is fitter than one which consists of a 
single shoot, and an organism which lives for thousands of years is fitter than a short-lived 
one (Simpson 2011). This makes intuitive sense since, in both cases, the more dispersed or 
longer-lived organism is, as a matter of fact, much more resistant to destruction. 
Nevertheless, other authors counter that differential persistence is not enough to 
ground a significant Darwinian process in the absence of reproduction (Godfrey-Smith 
2009, 152). Reproduction might, however, still not be strictly necessary for natural 
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selection to occur; a reproductive-like process may be enough. What is needed is for this 
reproductive-like process to permit multiplication (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 85; 104).
IOLC selection is a form of clade selection, but it is very unlike ordinary clade 
selection in at least two ways: first, the clades in question are genuinely independent, not 
phylogenetically related. Second, cladogenesis is not the form of “reproduction” proposed, 
which is arguably the most problematic feature of clade selection. Instead, it is proposed 
that interplanetary expansion constitutes a form of quasi-reproduction. Furthermore, 
interplanetary expansion extends the distribution range of the expanding IOLCs in a way 
that significantly reduces their extinction risk, thus promoting their long-term survival, 
which constitutes higher fitness, according to a broad definition of fitness.
Clade selection is based on differences in fitness among clades (Williams 1992, 25),
which translate into different probabilities of extinction3. These differences in fitness might
come about in various ways. For IOLCs, differences in fitness might result from what we 
may consider to be essential, or at least ‘frozen accidental’ properties of a IOLC, such as its
biochemical basis, established in the abiogenesis event; or it might result from the 
combined fitnesses of their component biosphere(s), such as their successful establishment 
in interaction with their particular planets, and the biodiversity achieved over its 
evolutionary history; or it might result from emergent properties of the IOLC itself, such as
its distribution range.
3 Williams explains these differences in fitness in terms of differences in the ratio of cladogenesis and 
extinction, but here I am disregarding cladogenesis altogether.
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4. Interplanetary Expansion as Quasi-reproduction and as Range Expansion. Before 
moving on to IOLC selection proper (sections 5 and 6), in this section we will look at how 
interplanetary expansion and the successful establishment of additional biospheres in non-
native planets contributes to IOLC fitness by functioning as a quasi-reproductive process 
which increases the distribution range of the IOLC and its intra-clade diversity. Both 
features contribute to the IOLC’s longevity over time by lowering its probability of 
extinction. Although IOLCs, like any clade, cannot reproduce per se, interplanetary 
expansion can function as a quasi-reproductive process, since a new biosphere established 
on a different planet can become independent of the original one. 
To see how expansion of a IOLC to another planet could be seen as a reproductive-
like process, suppose that humans were to colonize Mars. In order to colonize another 
planet, humans would need to carry plants or other photosynthetic organisms to produce 
oxygen, food to eat, and so on. In fact, colonists would probably need to carry several 
organisms to fulfill various needs, not to mention the microbial communities within their 
own bodies. In this sense, we would effectively be carrying a ‘propagule’ of Earth-life to 
another planet.
Although this transfer of a part of Earth-life from one planet to another would not 
constitute true reproduction, since it would not result in an independent clade, which is 
impossible by definition, it would nonetheless result in the production of an entity – a new 
biosphere – which despite belonging to the same clade, could go on to have an independent
existence in the new planet. This new entity would most likely follow a different 
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evolutionary path, and could even continue to exist after the demise of the parental entity, 
if life on Earth were to become extinct after life had already become established on Mars. 
So the ‘quasi-reproduction’ of Earth life would satisfy all of Okasha’s (2003, 2006) 
requirements for the occurrence of reproduction: the generation of a new entity at the same
level of biological organization, and its independence from the parental entity.
Furthermore, the expansion of life from one planet to another would involve the 
transfer of only a relatively small propagule, as it would not be possible to transport all of 
the original biota’s component parts. In this context, a propagule is any organism or group 
of organisms which can disperse the IOLC through interplanetary travel. This would in 
effect function as a bottleneck, which is a common feature of reproductive events and 
creates the conditions for a strong ‘founder effect’, and which differentiates the new entity 
even more from the parent entity (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 105). Although at first a small 
subset of the original planet’s life, the offspring aggregate would soon start to experience a 
different set of evolutionary constraints on the new planet. In the hypothetical example of 
Earth-life expansion to Mars, different prevailing conditions in that planet, including 
differences in temperature, lower gravity, red-heavy light spectrum, different atmosphere, 
etc, would begin to exert selective pressures on the terrestrial organisms in completely 
different directions as compared to Earth, with evolution on the new planet likely to follow
entirely different paths.
The independent existence of the new biosphere would depend on the amount of 
organisms and other materials exchanged between the two planets. Thus, if initially there 
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were frequent exchanges of material between the two planets, we might not be able to 
speak of true independent existence, but the two planets would be interconnected in much 
the same way that parent and offspring plants can be connected through the root system, 
exchanging nutrients and so on, but this connection can be severed, making the offspring 
plant fully independent. In any case, the potential for independent existence is what is 
needed for the offspring to be considered a different entity from the parent. The connection
could be severed at any moment, and the two biospheres would continue their independent 
existence.
The expansion of life from Earth to Mars in our hypothetical example could be 
described in two ways: as the expansion of the distribution range of a particular IOLC 
(Earth-life), or as a quasi-reproductive event in which the Earth’s biosphere gives rise to an
independent biosphere on a non-native planet. The biosphere can be seen as analogous to 
an asexually reproducing organism, while the IOLC is analogous to the species or lineage 
the organism belongs to. Thus we can make a parallel with species selection, where the 
fecundity and dispersal capacity of individual organisms gives rise to an emergent property
of the species – wider distribution range – which confers higher fitness to the species itself.
Similarly, IOLCs with wider distribution ranges, especially if spread across different 
planets, will be fitter than IOLCs with more restricted distribution ranges, especially those 
restricted to a single planet (see discussion in section 5).
At this point we might consider the possibility that selection might operate on 
biospheres as well. After all, biospheres are also likely to exhibit variation, with some traits
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being more favourable than others. However, there are two important aspects to consider: 
first, what is transported in interplanetary expansion is a small propagule, which, while it 
certainly carries some of the traits of the IOLC (for instance, its basic biochemistry, or its 
evolvability), it is unable to carry the properties of the biosphere which contribute to its 
longevity in its previous planet; in fact, even if quite a large propagule were carried, this 
would still not suffice to carry the biosphere’s traits with it, since those are specific to the 
particular life/planet interaction. Second, different biospheres are very unlikely to 
experience similar selective pressures. Instead, each experiences a different set of selective 
pressures specific to the particular planet4. This makes talking of selection among 
biospheres somewhat problematic.
On the other hand, the diversity among biospheres which is likely to result from 
those different selective pressures could itself be another feature of interplanetary 
expansion which might contribute to emergent IOLC fitness, through the increase in intra-
clade diversity. For instance, in species selection, it is not only high population size and 
wide distribution range that reduce a species probability of extinction, but also high 
intraspecific diversity.
5. Natural Selection of IOLCs. If there are multiple IOLCs in the universe, resulting from
multiple abiogenesis events, which is likely given the vastness of the universe; and if it is 
possible for life, at least on occasion, to expand beyond its native planet, then it is natural 
4 This is an oversimplification; evidently selective pressures will also vary within each planet and across 
time. But the point is that each planet will constrain the evolution of its biosphere in different ways (and 
indeed the biosphere itself will also constrain planetary evolution in particular ways).
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to assume that some IOLCs will have a higher dispersal capacity than others. This will 
result in those IOLCs becoming dispersed across multiple habitable planets, whereas 
IOLCs with lower or no dispersal capacity will be restricted to fewer or to a single planet, 
namely their native planet. Naturally, more highly dispersed IOLCs will have a lower 
probability of extinction; since “uniqueness is always more fragile than multiplicity” 
(Ćirković 2019).
Even in organisms that are well adapted to their environments, numerous threats 
can lead to extinction. Rapid environmental change and major catastrophic events such as 
asteroid strikes and widespread volcanism can lead to mass extinctions, as has happened 
several times on Earth, but those do not generally completely eliminate all life. Other 
threats, however, are liable not only to lead to complete destruction of any extant life, but 
even to render the planet uninhabitable – those include changes in solar diameter and 
radiation which happen as part of the normal ‘life cycle’ of main sequence stars, heavy 
asteroid bombardment, and other astronomical phenomena.
In the absence of interplanetary expansion, a IOLC eventually goes extinct in the 
planet where it originated, when either (i) a global catastrophic event such as large meteor 
strike destroys all life on the planet, or (ii) the original planet ceases to be habitable, for 
instance due to changes in energy radiating from its star. Scenario (i) may have occurred on
Earth, with possible previous life having gone extinct during the late heavy bombardment 
(Lowe and Byerly 2018), and a later abiogenesis event giving rise to the IOLC Earth-life 
(but this is controversial; see Abramov and Mojzsis 2009 for a dissenting view). Scenario 
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(ii) is thought to take place on Earth in about 1 billion years, if runaway climate change 
doesn’t get us there first. Evidently, if a IOLC is restricted to a single planet, it goes extinct
when the planet becomes uninhabitable; this is not necessarily the case for a IOLC which 
has established functioning biospheres in several planets, since different planets are likely 
to have different habitability windows.
In effect, the population of all IOLCs in the universe constitutes a Darwinian 
population, in which more expansive IOLCs will be positively selected to the detriment of 
less- or non-expansive ones. IOLC selection is thus analogous to species selection, as 
defended for instance by Jablonski. According to Jablonski (2008), species selection in the 
strict sense occurs when emergent traits at the species level, such as geographic range and 
population size, which cannot be reduced to organism-level traits, confer an advantage on 
those species in comparison to others, leading to different extinction rates which determine
macroevolutionary patterns across time. A similar situation can happen in the case of 
IOLCs: if some IOLCs are spread out across several planets, the probability of their 
extinction is lower than that of IOLCs which are restricted to fewer or a single planet.
Several IOLC traits might increase the probability of successful expansion: to begin
with, the successful establishment of a functioning biosphere in the native planet is likely 
to be essential to the survival of the IOLC until such time as it is able to expand to 
additional planets. The early development, and long-term maintenance, of harmonious 
biogeochemical cycles appropriate for the abiotic resources available in the native planet is
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likely to be crucial for the IOLC’s longevity in its native planet (Knoll 2003; Chopra and 
Lineweaver 2016; Doolittle 2019), which in turn increases the likelihood of expansion.
Chopra and Lineweaver (2016) hypothesize that, since the ingredients for life seem 
to be abundantly available in the universe, and yet life, from what we can observe, seems 
to be rare, the most likely explanation is that there is a ‘Gaian bottleneck’ which most life 
does not survive. They assume that planets with conditions for abiogenesis tend to have 
short habitability windows, unless the planetary biota is able to establish a functioning 
biosphere that can counteract runaway positive feedbacks, generating a stable environment 
through the interaction between life and environment, and thereby significantly extending 
the habitability window of the planet. If their hypothesis is correct, then the capacity of a 
IOLC to successfully establish a functioning biosphere capable of extending the 
habitability window of its planet is crucial in extending the IOLC’s longevity.
Other IOLC traits which are likely to decrease the probability of extinction during 
its single-planet phase of existence might be: high evolvability, high biodiversity, and wide 
environmental breadth of its component species, all of which decrease the risk of IOLC 
extinction during mass extinction events, and increase the probability of successful 
interplanetary expansion, since this probability is likely to increase over time. Equally, 
high evolvability is essential for the successful establishment of new biospheres once 
interplanetary transfer has been achieved.
As to how interplanetary expansion might take place, although in the example 
above of Earth-life expansion to Mars interplanetary expansion is achieved through the 
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deliberate technological transport of organisms carried out by humans, there are other 
possible alternatives. One is that interplanetary expansion might be entirely accidental; the 
result of the exchange of materials between planets in relatively close proximity coupled 
with the capacity to survive vacuum exposure and atmosphere re-entry on the part of some 
microorganisms, no doubt evolved in entirely different contexts. Another possibility is that 
of accidental technological transport of microorganisms in the context of space 
exploration. For instance, it is much easier for Earth-life to be transported to Mars or other 
planets in the solar system via microbial contamination of unmanned probes, than it is for 
humans, who constructed these probes, to actually expand to Mars, or to other planets, 
themselves. In fact, despite the extraordinary precautions taken to avoid said contamination
(Meltzer 2012), the possibility that viable terrestrial microbes may already be present on 
Mars, and other solar system locations, cannot be excluded. This possibility highlights the 
fact that the organisms transported and the ones enabling the transport are not necessarily 
the same ones. It is also conceivable that specific adaptations for interplanetary transport 
might evolve in highly expansive IOLCs, although we are in no position to speculate on 
what those might involve.
6. Competition Between IOLCs. The vast majority of the universe is extremely 
inhospitable to life. It is likely that life can only occur on a subset of planets which have 
certain features that render them habitable, such as a certain range of temperatures, 
presence of liquid water, or others. Therefore, life is likely to have a very patchy 
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distribution. It may seem problematic for natural selection to act on such widely dispersed 
entities as IOLCs, because they are likely to come into direct competition very 
infrequently.
Yet natural selection does not require the selected entities to interact directly or 
even be close by. For example, Sterelny (1996) argues that selective pressures cannot be 
equated with physical proximity, concluding that selection can occur at the species level 
even if the species in question are widely separated, as long as they differ with respect to 
some character that affects their fitness. He gives the example of widely separated 
populations infected by the same parasite species (Sterenly 1996). Another example might 
be selection favouring sexually reproducing species: the species affected by this selective 
process have been widely separated in space and time, as well as taxonomically diverse 
(Okasha 2006). In fact, being able to colonize new habitats, or even the property of being 
widely dispersed or fragmented into separate populations, can itself be a fundamental 
driver of species selection (Williams 1992; Sterelny 1996).
Williams (1992) also suggests two cases of natural selection without direct 
competition: the case of two individual soil arthropods who spend all their lives separated 
by hundreds of meters, yet can be said to be competing for future representation of their 
genes in the gene pool, and a corresponding example of selection between two species of 
trout with different vulnerability to climate change. The trout can, in William’s (1992) 
example, be said to be competing for representation in the biota. In the case of IOLC 
selection, we could say that the different IOLCs are competing for continued existence in 
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the limited habitable space in the universe. This suggests that, at IOLC level, physical-
enviromental effects on evolutionary change will be preponderant over direct biotic 
interactions, in accordance with the ‘Court Jester’ hypothesis (Barnosky 2001).
On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that life forms belonging to different 
IOLCs might come into direct contact. The same planet might come to be inhabited by two
distinct life-clades. This could happen either through the occurrence of two or more 
distinct abiogenesis events on the same planet, or through the expansion of life to an 
already inhabited planet. The first scenario has been anticipated by Doolittle (2019), who 
suggests that there might have been other, independently evolved lineages other than the 
one which includes LUCA (the last universal common ancestor), that did not leave 
descendants. Should those other lineages have resulted from separate abiogenesis events, 
that would constitute a case of direct IOLC competition.
While there is very good evidence that all extant life on Earth shares a common 
ancestor, that might not have been the case. It is conceivable that on a given planet, 
possibly one where abiogenesis conditions are highly prevalent, several abiogenesis events 
might take place simultaneously, or in a geologically short time, in different parts of the 
planet. Later, the different IOLCs come into contact but, instead of one IOLC simply out-
competing the others, they might go on to form a hybrid biosphere.
Alternatively, suppose that two independent abiogenesis events take place on the 
same planet, but there is complete biochemical incompatibility between the two kinds of 
life that originate. In that case, the two IOLCs would not form a hybrid biosphere; the 
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planet would instead sustain two independent biospheres – this is exactly what has been 
proposed in the hypothesis of a “shadow biosphere” on Earth (Davies et al. 2009; Cleland 
2019, 195-216).
The second scenario in which IOLCs might come into direct contact on the same 
planet is if a IOLC expands to an already inhabited planet. This would likely lead to direct 
competition, the results of which would depend as much on the details of biology as on 
technological sophistication or cognitive ability. This sort of competition would probably 
develop along the lines of invasion ecology (Mooney and Cleland 2001), but on a much 
larger scale.
Another interesting hypothetical case to consider would be interplanetary expansion
of hybrid biospheres, in cases where more than one IOLC is represented in a planet’s 
biosphere. Interplanetary expansion might in that case involve either one of the two 
IOLCs, or both, much like a lichen can reproduce by producing a propagule of the two 
symbiotic partners, but the fungal partner can also reproduce by itself.
It might also happen that a IOLC expands to one or more planets, where it 
establishes new biospheres and, eventually, a subset of organisms from these independent 
biotas, which belong to the same IOLC, travel back to the original planet, where it comes 
into direct competition with the extant biota. This would be a case of intra-IOLC 
competition, which is equivalent to intra-specific competition in the case of species. For 
comparison, suppose for instance that in a certain bird species only a small percentage of 
the population migrates; it is possible that these individuals, or their descendants, later 
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return to the original grounds, where they come into competition with the resident 
population, which did not migrate.
More dramatically, inter-civilizational encounters have been hypothesized to 
develop along the lines of the ‘Dark Forest’ rule, with civilizations being destroyed as soon
as they are discovered, following a game-theoretic logic of preventative elimination of 
potential threats (Yu 2015; Kovic 2021). On the other hand, fear of even more 
technologically advanced hostile civilizations might curtail expansionary programmes 
altogether. The degree to which these considerations might be relevant to inter-IOLC 
competition will depend on the frequency of a sequence of events, from abiogenesis to the 
development of technology capability that allows for interplanetary expansion, and also on 
factors such as how frequently technologically advanced civilizations destroy themselves.
Nevertheless, it is likely that most IOLCs do not come into direct contact. This 
might seem problematic since Godfrey-Smith’s concept of a Darwinian population, even in
the minimal sense, does require “a collection of causally connected individual things” 
(2009, 39). This causal connection need not be direct interaction, but it is necessary for the 
individual things “to be located in a common network of causal interaction – with each 
other, with environmental conditions, or both” (39-40). If, as seems likely, habitable 
planets are a restricted subset of all planets, then this is a limited resource which different 
IOLCs compete for, with highly expansive IOLCs acquiring more of this resource, which 
then becomes unavailable to other IOLCs (except possibly through direct competition).
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7. Natural Selection and Life in the Universe. It might be countered that, at the scale of 
IOLCs, natural selection will never be the most important force; instead, luck will be more 
important, as it generally is in mass extinctions (Benton 2008, 22). Entire biospheres will 
often be wiped out by random events, regardless of how complex and well adapted they 
might be. Yet, while it is true that life is vulnerable to such random catastrophic events, this
is also the case with organisms. For example, even if natural selection tends to favour a 
certain phenotype over another, a healthy individual instantiating the more favourable 
phenotype will still be vulnerable to random catastrophic events. This does not preclude 
the effectiveness of natural selection in the long run. On the contrary, expansion beyond 
the native planet would function as a protection against extinction caused by catastrophic 
events. IOLCs which have expanded beyond their home planet are less likely to be wiped 
out by a random catastrophic event, which is why they would have an evolutionary 
advantage against less expansive or non-expansive ones.
If natural selection does operate at IOLC level, IOLCs with higher dispersal 
capacity will become more common in the universe than those with lower or no expansion 
capacity.  We should thus hypothesize the history of life in the Universe to go something 
like this: once conditions in some parts of the universe became suitable for life, some life 
forms will have emerged; with time, more life forms appear, while others become extinct; 
later on, we should expect that there will be fewer, but more widely dispersed life forms. In
other words, over time, more planets will be occupied by fewer IOLCs. This might, but 
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need not necessarily, involve direct competition between independently originated life 
clades.
Even if natural selection makes interplanetary expansion more common over time, 
however, life will always face the problem of the limited availability of habitable planets, 
and the immense distances separating them. These limitations may significantly reduce the 
chances of galaxy-wide expansion, even on the part of IOLCs with high dispersal capacity. 
Hence, we should expect life in the universe to occur in small clusters, mainly within 
specific solar systems with multiple habitable planetary bodies. Furthermore, if 
interplanetary expansion is often actively carried out by cognitively sophisticated species, 
then game theoretic considerations involving the risk of elimination by hostile civilizations
may play a role in the decision whether or not to engage in expansion.
Crucially, conditions for abiogenesis are more stringent than conditions for 
habitability, so it is reasonable to suppose that the number of habitable planets in the 
universe far outnumbers those with conditions for abiogenesis (Cockell et al. 2016). While 
on Earth there are virtually no habitable, but uninhabited, habitats – that is, life is nearly 
ubiquitous on Earth – it is likely that there are many planets in the universe which are 
lifeless, despite being habitable (Cockell et al. 2016). These planets constitute available 
habitats for life forms originated elsewhere which are able to colonize them.
If there are more planets which can support life than planets with conditions for 
abiogenesis, and if, over time, more expansive IOLCs are likely to become more common 
in the universe through natural selection, then some habitable planets where abiogenesis is 
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highly unlikely or even impossible may become secondarily colonized by IOLCs 
originating from neighboring planets. Therefore, even planets where life cannot originate 
still have a higher than zero probability of becoming inhabited, and the likelihood of their 
colonization will increase with the number of potentially life-bearing planets in the 
vicinity. Thus, solar systems with multiple habitable planetary bodies make exceptionally 
good targets for astrobiology exploration.
8. The Place of Life in Scientific Theory. In this section, I would like to assess what the 
theory proposed in this paper means for the place of life in scientific theory, an important 
question recently raised by Reydon (2021).
Hermida (2016) argued that life on Earth is an individual, based on its historical 
nature, spatio-temporal continuity, monophyly, and material continuity at the cellular level.
However, this idea has been interpreted in different ways. For example, Mariscal and 
Doolittle (2018) agree that Earth-life is an individual, but attempt to draw from it the 
conclusion that life is not a natural kind, and that it therefore makes no sense to attempt to 
define life, as we would merely be comparing possible candidates with this one thing, 
Earth-Life, which, somewhat misleadingly, they call ‘Life’.
However, as Reydon (2021) points out, it does not really follow from the fact that 
life on Earth is an individual that it is the only one of its kind. Hermida’s (2016) contention
that ‘life on Earth’ is but one particular instance of a kind that may, and probably has, 
multiple members, is perfectly reasonable, unless one believes that life has appeared only 
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once in the whole universe, which does not seem likely considering its vast scale. While 
Mariscal and Doolittle are quick to deny that viewing the category of life as “illusory” 
should in any way compromise research in astrobiology or synthetic biology, it is hard to 
agree with the claim that their view “should liberate these fields from futile theorizing or 
overly-restrictive Life-centric criteria for success or failure”, when criteria for identifying 
life is precisely what researchers in those fields cannot do without, even though such 
criteria must at present be tentative.
Reydon (2021) ultimately agrees that the pursuit of definitions of life is a pointless 
endeavour, but for a different reason: he argues that the search for a definition of ‘life’ 
should be abandoned because ‘life’ “does not feature as a theoretical term in any scientific 
theory (in the way that ‘species’, ‘gene’, and so on do)”, and so has no role to play in a 
naturalistic metaphysics. In particular, Reydon claims that there there is no scientific theory
in which ‘Life’ – or, more adequately, ‘Earth-life’ – features as a particular individual:
While Mariscal and Doolittle (2018, p. 2) specify that life on Earth (or, Life) is a 
historical entity, they do not show that there is a scientific theory in which the 
theoretical term ‘life’ features and refers to a particular individual. That is, they 
highlight a possible entity in the world and introduce a proper name (‘Life’) for it, but 
do not say whether there is a scientific theory that is about this individual and would 
allow us to explicate what sort of individual Life is. In other words, the claim that life 
on Earth is an individual metaphysically underdetermines the nature of life, because 
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there is no scientific theory in which ‘life’ features as a term denoting a particular sort 
of individual. (Reydon 2021, 3403)
On the one hand, it does not seem reasonable to expect that a particular individual 
(Earth-life) should feature in a scientific theory, since scientific theories are not about 
individuals, but about kinds. This point is made by Hull (1976, 1978), who argues that a 
scientific theory, such as Darwinian evolution, is about classes of things, such as biological
species or organisms, which are kinds of things that could arise anywhere in the universe; 
it is not about particular species such as swan, which is a spatio-temporally restricted 
individual, although it applies to it insofar as Cygnus olor is a particular instance of a 
biological species. In the same way, Newton’s theory of gravitation is about physical 
objects in general, not specifically about Mars, although it applies to Mars because Mars is 
an example of a physical object.
On the other hand, Reydon does seem to bring up an important point, which might 
be rephrased in the following way: if Earth-life is an individual but, far from being the only
one of its kind, is in fact an example of a category of thing, then we might expect this 
category of thing to play a role in scientific explanation; otherwise, the justification for the 
claim that there is such a category of thing seems to be lacking, within a naturalistic 
metaphysics.
But its absence from scientific explanation might simply reflect the current state of 
biology in the early twenty-first century. Perhaps the claim that there is no scientific theory
28
featuring the category of thing of which life on Earth is an individual instance could be 
comparable to the fact that planetary science was profoundly underdeveloped prior to the 
empirical discovery of extra-solar planets, or that the study of galaxies was seriously 
lacking in the early twentieth-century, when it was debated whether the Milky Way was the
only galaxy in the universe, or whether “elliptical nebulae” were in fact other galaxies.
While Reydon is correct that both Hermida’s (2016) and Mariscal and Doolittle’s 
(2018) claim that life on Earth is an individual is a merely local claim, which refers only to
life on Earth, it is nonetheless also the case that the claim is made from quite distinct 
standpoints: while Hermida (2016) explicitly posited life on Earth as an individual instance
of a larger category, Mariscal and Doolittle (2018) defend a complete opposite approach, 
considering life on Earth as the only “Life”.
Contrasting Earth-life as an individual with species as individuals, Reydon points to
the necessity of theoretical context for these sorts of claims: “The case of species showed 
that the proponents of the species-are-individuals thesis explicitly assumed the context of 
evolutionary theory, such that the implicit claim was that species are evolutionary 
individuals. The case of life showed that the main problem for kinds thinking and 
individuals thinking regarding life is that the required theoretical context is lacking. There 
is no theory in which ‘life’ features as a theoretical entity, the argument goes, such that 
there is nothing for naturalistic metaphysics to do. [emphasis in original]” (Reydon 2021, 
3404).
29
In this paper I have proposed a theory of life in the universe which takes, not life 
simpliciter, but Earth-life, the large clade composed of the all organisms descending from a
particular abiogenesis event, to be an individual instance of a larger category of things in 
the universe, the category of all independent ‘trees-of-life’ in the universe, or 
independently originated life clades. I have argued that the set of all IOLCs in the universe 
forms a Darwinian population that can be subject to natural selection. As in the case of 
species, evolutionary theory provides both the theoretical context for the claim that Earth-
life is an individual, and the theoretical framework within which to understand what kind 
of entity it is an instance of.
9. Conclusion. I have attempted to develop a biological hypothesis concerning the 
application of natural selection to life in the universe. Whatever its merits, it is intended as 
a serious scientific hypothesis; it is an extension of the domain of application of Darwinian
evolutionary theory that, although speculative, is no more fanciful than other such 
extensions, including outside of biology, such as Smolin’s (1992) hypothesis of natural 
selection of universes as an explanation for the apparent fine-tuning of several important 
cosmological constants.
The proper object of study of biology is life, not life on Earth, which is our locally 
available sample. Despite its status as a so-called ‘historical’ science, biology is, in 
principle, no more restricted to our particular planet than planetary science was restricted 
to our particular solar system prior to the discovery of extra-solar planets, despite their 
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existence being far from certain. In fact, were it not for keen speculation on such 
possibilities, the research that led to their discovery would never have been carried out.
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